In this investigation we study the effects of compression and frame rate reduction on the performance of four video analytics (VA) systems utilizing a low complexity scenario, such as the Sterile Zone (SZ). Additionally, we identify the most influential scene parameters affecting the performance of these systems. The SZ scenario is a scene consisting of a fence, not to be trespassed, and an area with grass. The VA system needs to alarm when there is an intruder (attack) entering the scene. The work includes testing of the systems with uncompressed and compressed (using H.264/MPEG-4 AVC at 25 and 5 frames per second) footage, consisting of quantified scene parameters. The scene parameters include descriptions of scene contrast, camera to subject distance, and attack portrayal. Additional footage, including only distractions (no attacks) is also investigated. Results have shown that every system has performed differently for each compression/frame rate level, whilst overall, compression has not adversely affected the performance of the systems. Frame rate reduction has decreased performance and scene parameters have influenced the behavior of the systems differently. Most false alarms were triggered with a distraction clip, including abrupt shadows through the fence. Findings could contribute to the improvement of VA systems.
The work includes testing of the systems with D1 PAL resolution of uncompressed and compressed (6 levels of compression using H.264/MPEG-4 AVC at 25 and 5 frames per second) footage, consisting of quantified scene parameters. The scene parameters were extracted from the characterization of the content of 110 attacks (scenes). The characterization included both objective and subjective techniques relating to scene contrast (contrast between main subject and background), camera to subject distance, subject description (e.g. one person, two people), subject approach (e.g. run, walk), and subject orientation (e.g. perpendicular, diagonal). After the characterization, the scenes were grouped based on common parameters. Additional footage, including only distractions (i.e. no attacks to be detected) is also investigated. Distractions are elements in the scene, such as abrupt illumination changes and birds that could be falsely recognized by the systems as intruders.
This work is a continuation of a previous investigation on the subject published in 2012 [11] and provides more results as additional footage (attacks) has been investigated. The previous work concentrated on the creation of appropriate distorted datasets (compressed and with reduced frame rate), whereas in this current work the concentration is on the testing of VA systems with the distorted datasets. Section 2 contains some background information on analytics systems, video compression, and introduces a new "image quality" definition for automated systems. Section 3 presents the experimental methodology. Data analysis of the results is described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results. Lastly, in Section 6, conclusions are drawn along with suggestions for future work.
THEORY
VA systems can operate in real time (i.e. incidence alert) and in post event analysis (i.e. when incorporated within a recorder for event based retrieval) [12] . Little research has been done in the area of image compression and analytics systems, because currently only few scenarios are capable for autonomous analysis (SZ is one of them) [1] . Nonetheless, this area is receiving a large amount of research investment, even though it is still in its infancy [1, 2] . In a world of rapid technological change, analytics systems will need to be more flexible and be suitable for use in post-event forensics and with limited transmission bandwidth (e.g. through an Internet Protocol network). Additionally, understanding on how the analytics systems perform with compression, frame rate reduction and defined scene parameters could contribute to further improvement in the development of such systems. For example, in this investigation, VA systems are tested using controlled footage in terms of conveyed information, which allows a better understanding on how the systems perform.
In one investigation [13] with the SZ scenario and H.264/MPEG-4 AVC video coding standard, the results have shown the performance of the analytics system to be affected at 220kbps, either by not detecting an attack, or producing a slower alarm response time. That work investigated 11 attacks with only one VA system. In this current investigation, a much greater amount of footage was processed using four government approved VA systems.
In Europe the standard video frame rate for television is 25 frames per second (fps) (or 50 i interlaced fields). Commonly, security systems record/transmit video data at lower frame rates in order to satisfy storage and transmission requirements. Reducing the standard frame rate increases the possibility of missing important information from the initial video sequence. Low frame rate is considered equivalent to 'abrupt motion', or discontinuity by tracking algorithms [14] . These tracking algorithms, which are commonly used by analytics systems, frequently use motion continuity and their performance is consequently affected by low frame rate [15, 16] .
Compression standards are developed around the sensitivity of the human eye in order to make compression artefacts less, or not visible to humans. Nevertheless, these "non visible" artefacts might affect the performance of mathematical algorithms applied by VA systems. A previous subjective investigation (i.e. with police staff) on the identification of faces from compressed CCTV footage has shown the results to be highly dependent on scene content. For example, compression affected more dark and bright lightness scenes, as they obtained lower subjective scores than medium lightness scenes. Thus, someone can conclude that image parameters affect the usefulness of the imagery to complete a task for subjective investigations.
Image usefulness is a visio-cognitive attribute of image quality that relates to "the degree of apparent suitability of the reproduced image to satisfy the correspondent task" [17, 18] . The same definition of image quality has also been used for automated systems [4] . The image usefulness definition could be used for automated systems, in terms of the completion of tasks, but the image parameters that affect performance of humans and automated systems might be different. At the moment there is little research relating to the effects that image quality has in automated systems. Also, the term "image quality" has been defined by imaging scientists to be strictly subjective [19, 20] . Perhaps, a new definition such as image acceptance could be employed for automated systems that will relate to the parameter (scene content) acceptance by the system/algorithm to complete the identification task. Algorithms can be tuned and trained on scene content parameters (e.g. to work with low illumination scenes).
METHODOLOGY
The methodology includes three main steps: a) preparation of the test footage (uncompressed and distorted), b) scene content characterization to define image parameters, and c) testing of the VA systems.
Preparation of the test footage
The SZ dataset is segmented into shorter video clips. Table I , provides a general description of the seventeen clips under investigation. These clips include 110 attacks and have 11 hours duration of footage. This part of the dataset was selected based on the availability of the original tape recordings of the scenario. The uncompressed footage was originally recorded using analogue DigiBeta videocassettes at D1 PAL resolution (720 × 576), 50ifps (interlaced frames per second) and a bitrate of 12 megabytes per second (mbps). DigiBeta uses a lossless compression at 10-bit, compressing YUV channels with a chroma subsampling corresponding to 4:2:2. The iLIDS team provides the publically available datasets with 10% compression and only the tapes could have been used to obtain the "uncompressed" reference. The MPEG Streamclip implementation encoder was employed to compress the clips at selected target bitrates and frame rates, using the video coding standard H.264/MPEG-4 AVC, which is widely used in surveillance applications [5, 11, 21] . The MPEG Streamclip encoder was selected with only bitrate control (i.e. no GOP size, or B frames were selected), because it complies with the common functioning of security recording systems [5, 11] . The compression bitrates used were approximately the following in kilobits per second (kbps) for each type of the chosen frame rate: -25fps: 200, 400, 800, 1200, 1800, 2000; -5fps: 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, 400. The degraded footage produced at 5fps repeats each of the extracted 5 frames 5 times in each second. The range of the bitrates at 5fps were chosen to be equivalent to the bitrates at 25fps taking into consideration the reduction of frame rate.
The test footage for the VA systems consists of the reference and its twelve degraded versions. The range of the degraded versions was chosen to cover a variety of compressed qualities. Findings in automated face recognition have shown that compression, even at ratios as low as 10:1, does not adversely affect the performance of the systems and it has been shown that some compression ratios even increase the performance of face recognition systems [22] [23] [24] [25] . The behavior of the VA systems might be similar to automated face recognition systems. It was considered important to include a variety of degraded footage (high and low).
Scene content characterization
The characterization of the scene content of each attack should enable a better understanding of the parameters that might affect the performance, in terms of correct detection, of analytics systems. The influential parameters could be related to image quality attributes (e.g. contrast, sharpness), and/or the properties of the subject to be detected (e.g. orientation). Each of the 110 attacks was classified into content parameters. Table II , includes the name and total number of each parameter in each group. The parameters that describe the properties of the subject (groups: approach, description, distance, and orientation) in the attacks were extracted by visual examination (apart from the distance group) and were already available within the ground truth data of the SZ dataset. The approach group parameters describe the way the subject approaches the fence and consists of 9 levels. The description group parameters consist of 2 levels and explain if the subject includes one person or two people next to each other (i.e. this indicates a bigger subject area to be detected). The distance group parameters consist of 3 levels and describe the distance of the subject to the camera; far -30 meters away from the camera, middle -15 meters away from the camera, and close -10 meters away from the camera. Figure 1 provides an example of the distance group parameters. Orientation group parameters consist of two levels and indicate if the attack happened perpendicular or diagonal to the fence. If the attack happens diagonal then the subject is in the scene for a longer time than with a perpendicular attack. Parameters describing the image quality of the attack belong to the contrast group and their values were obtained by using simply a ratio of dark to light area between foreground (attacker) and background (grass area). The derived values from the contrast ratio range from 0 to +1 (see Eq.1).
Where L max and L min are the maximum and minimum lightness values respectively. The lightness values were derived by measuring lightness in specific areas in the scene using the CIELAB L* color space. Lightness (L*) values ranged from 0 (no lightness -black) to 100 (maximum lightness-white). For each attack scene, two lightness measures were derived: 1) one on the surrounding grass area of the subject/s (the average of four areas around the attacker -above, below, left and right), 2) and the second one on the clothing of the subject/s (the average of four areas on the attacker -upper body, lower body, left and right legs). The subjects, in the footage wear only two types of clothing, white or green. The head of the subject/s was excluded from the measurements in order to avoid complications with the measured lightness. Furthermore, these measurements were applied on three different positions of the attacker in the scene (beginning, middle and near to the fence). An average value from the three positions in the scene was selected to be used in the CR formula. The CR formula provides measures of "visual contrast" as CIELAB is a perceptual color space. In Table II , next to the parameters under the contrast group, information on the range of the obtained contrast value is provided along with the total number of scenes for each parameter. 
Testing of the VA systems
The four VA systems under investigation are isolated units (not incorporated within a recorder) and are designed to take composite signals as input. The VA systems have been optimized for the testing with the iLIDS SZ scenario. The four systems have received UK Government approval and could be further classified as operationally successful systems. The systems have been labeled as A, B, C, and D.
For measuring the performance of the analytics systems, a method was required to simultaneously play the video clips and record the alarm attacks raised. Important criteria were to keep the video quality as high as possible and the ability to accurately determine the time-code from the video file, so that alarm times could be recorded precisely. The VLC application from VideoLan [26] was chosen to act as the player running on an Intel i7 PC with Windows 7.
An ATI Radeon X1300 graphics card with PAL composite output was used to feed the analytics systems via a Kramer 105VB distribution amplifier (see Figure 2) . A broadcast standard graphics card was considered, but the effort to integrate this with the system was beyond the scope of the project. The analytics systems signal the detection of an alarm attack by shorting out a normally open contact on one, or more of their output connectors. To interface these to the PC, an Amplicon PCI236 Digital I/O card was used via an EX230 Isolation Panel. A bespoke software application written in C# was used to integrate VLC with the Amplicon card. The Net API called nVLC [27] was used to interface to the VLC libraries directly and derive a precise time-code from the playing video.
The developed software allows for multiple video clips to be queued for play-out, with each clip being able to play multiple times. With a video clip playing, alarm attacks were captured via the Amplicon card. Each alarm was saved along with the corresponding clip time, clip name, device name and repeat number to a simple text file. The ground truth data for each clip was then compared with this file.
The rules determining whether an alarmed attack was true, or false were defined as follows: if an alarm falls within the ground truth alarm period, then a true match is recorded; if there are further alarms within the same period they are ignored; if an alarm occurs outside of the ground truth period, then that is noted as a false alarm. The obtained results have scores of 1 for the correctly detected attacks and 0 for the un-detected attacks. To estimate the consistency of recording the results, each clip was repeated 10 times with black video of thirty seconds played between each clip to reset the algorithm settings. Most of the manufacturers of the systems confirmed that it takes about 10 seconds for their algorithms to be adjusted/tuned to the scene properties (e.g. weather conditions such as rain or snow). There were some small variations in the results between the repeats, due to the noise added to the video signal (i.e. as part of the output of footage to the detection systems), and/or the actual intrinsic parameters of the analytics systems (i.e. how it is tuned) and/or the properties of the events (i.e. it was observed that variation was triggered by certain events). This phenomenon was investigated further by repeating the whole process (10 repeats on 3 clips with attacks) another five times. The derived proportional values (i.e. average of 10 repeats) among the further five repeats were consistent and similar. Also, the proportion values of each of the five sets of 10 repeats fell within the range of the calculated 95% of the exact confidence interval for proportion data method [28] . For example, if in 10 repeats of an attack, only 3 get successfully detected (0.3 proportion) then in another 10 repeats of the same attack, the proportion, according to 95% of the exact confidence interval method, will range between 0.0667 and 0.6525.
RESULTS
The analysis of the results has been divided into three parts. The first part identifies the global detection performance for each individual system with respect to compression (section 4.1); the second part identifies the most influential attack parameters for each individual system with respect to compression (section 4.2); and the third part provides an analysis on false alarms (section 4.3).
Global detection performance analysis with respect to compression
The global performance analyzes the relationship between detection performances of all the attacks with respect to compression (at 25fps and 5fps). As it has been mentioned in section 3.3, all the VA systems under investigation have produced some variation in the results from the 10 repeats of each clip/attack. Thus, the results are not strictly binary but rather proportional with a binary nature. The results represent two categories, which are success (correct detectionscore of 1) and failure (no detection -score of 0). In order to take into consideration the number of successes in an n repeated number of trials (i.e. in this case 10) for each attack, the recorded results were modeled using logistic regression with the generalized linear model (gml) function in R software for statistics [29] . In this way a weighted regression is carried out, using the number of trials as weights and the logit link function to ensure linearity [30, 31] . The logit link function is a transformation that uses the natural log of odds (p/q, where p are the successes and where q the failures). All the statistical analysis of results, in this section and section 4.2 were curried out in R.
All graphs in this section and section 4.2 consist of raw points (black triangles and gray dots) and lines (black and gray, most of them are logistic regression models), which correspond respectively to results obtained from 25fps and 5fps. In Figure 3 , each row corresponds to one of the VA systems A, B, C and D and from left to right columns the graphs represent: a) the raw data points represent the proportion of detection of each individual scene (from the repeated 10 trials) and the lines are the derived logistic regression models obtained from modeling of the raw data (see table III for further details on the fitted logistic regression models) with respect to the different levels of compression (i.e. in ln kbps), b) the points (connected with a line) represent the proportion of the always correctly identified scenes from all the 10 repeated trials (the Yes scenes) and are plotted against the different levels of compression (i.e in ln kbps) and the "uncompressed" reference, c) the points (connected with a line) represent the proportion of the always no correctly identified scenes from all the 10 repeated trials (the No scenes) and are plotted against the different levels of compression (i.e in ln kbps) and the "uncompressed" reference, and d) the points (connected with a line) represent the proportion of the uncertain scenes (produced varied detection from the 10 repeated trials -Uncertain scenes) and are plotted against the different levels of compression (i.e in ln kbps) and the "uncompressed" reference. The sum of the corresponding proportions in the three graphs (Yes scenes, No scenes and Uncertain scenes) would be equal to 100%. Table III includes details of the fitted logistic regression models in Figure 3 . The first column provides the system name and the type of the raw data (25fps or 5fps). The second column provides details on the family of the model depending on over-dispersion (binomial or quasi-binomial). The third and sixth columns provide information on the derived coefficients of each model (intercept and slope). Their next columns provide the calculated standard error on the coefficients (STD). Where Pr(>|t|) is the statistical p value identifying any significant trends (Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1). For example, the results in table III indicate a significant correlation between proportional detection of attacks and compression levels for only systems A and D, and at only 5fps. 
Parameter performance analysis with respect to compression
This section includes diagnostics with a detailed analysis on the performance of each system for each scene parameter under investigation. V) are scores associating with the importance of the parameter to the overall obtained results (from all the scenes) with respect to the rest of the parameters. For example, if the score is negative than it is a penalty score (parameter contributed to less correct detection) and if the score is positive than it is a bonus score (parameter contributed to more correct detection). If a parameter does not have a score (does not appear in the table), it is assumed to be zero [32] . The prediction on the performance of an attack scene with specific parameters is given by adding up the scores of the parameters plus the intercept. Extreme score values are caused when a parameter does not consist with a variety of data (successes and failures, not just successes). For example, the 'log roll' parameter (appears only in three attacks) happens to always be detected correctly. In these situations the optimizer in logistic regression over fits the model and becomes more generous with the scores. Table VII provides a summary of the two most negatively influential parameters (have produced the lowest penalty scores) for each system at the different five combinations of bitrates and frame rates. 
False alarms
Table VIII consists of four sub-tables that correspond to each of the four VA systems. The sub-tables provide information on the system name, the clip number (clip description can be found in table I), amount of compression and number of frame rates (e.g. 2000kbps at 25fps -2000/25), and the total summed number of the false alarms occurred from the 10 repeated trials. For example, system A (Sys. A) produced 210 false alarms (e.g. average of 21 false alarms 210/10) with compressed footage at 2000kbps and 25fps for clip 12. "None" indicates zero production of false alarms. Some compression levels are missing in the sub-tables for systems C and D as no false alarms were produced for these missing compression levels. 
DISCUSSION
Results have shown that every system performed differently for each compression/frame rate level (see the Yes, No and Uncertain scene graphs in Figure 3 ), but overall compression has not adversely affected the performance of the systems (see regression lines in Figure 3 , left column). The results in Table III indicate a significant correlation between proportion detection of attacks and compression for only systems A and D and at only for 5fps. This is also shown in the corresponding logistic regression graphs in Figure 3 . We conclude that the proportion of correct attack detection for systems A and D at 5fps increases significantly with increasing kbps (less compression). For the rest of the compression levels and systems, compression has not affected the overall performance of the systems. This is overall a positive result, since it indicates that footage can be significantly compressed (for storage or transmission purposes) with very little loss in the correct attack identification.
Some systems have performed better (A and D) than others (B and C). For example, in Figure 3 the total number of attacks always detected (Yes scene graphs) is higher for both 25fps and 5fps for the better systems than the rest. Some further observations can be made from the Yes scene graphs: a) System A performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and high compression levels (200kbps at 25fps and 40kbps at 5fps), b) System B performance has dropped with the reference footage and a slight increase can be seen at 2000kbps with 25fps. Also, performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and with higher compression at 5fps. c) System C performance seems to be constant throughout the different levels of compression/frame rates and increase of performance can be seen at higher compression levels (200kbps at 25fps) and with reduced frame rate. d) System D performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and high compression levels at 5fps (40kbps at 5fps).
In the No scene graphs (in Figure 3) , the performance at 25fps and 5fps was similar for systems C and D. For systems A and B, more missed attacks were observed at 5 fps. In the uncertain scenes graphs (in Figure 3) , the performance at 25fps and 5fps has been the same for systems A, B and C. Dropped of performance, in terms of proportion of attacks causing uncertainty, can be seen for system D at 5fps.
Most false alarms (Table VIII) were triggered with the distraction clip 12, which was filmed on a sunny day. Clip 12 contains small clouds in the sky causing many abrupt illumination changes and moving shadows through the fence (see Table I for clip description). Not many false alarms were produced from the clips containing attacks. An analysis based on the scene content parameters enables understanding on where systems need improvement. Figures 4 to 7 provide a quick visual examination on the performance of the systems for the individual parameters. This visual examination enables understanding on identifying the parameters where the systems have not performed well. For example, system D, in the Approach parameters group, has not performed well for run and crouch run parameters but has performed well for the rest of the parameters in the approach group.
The most influential parameters (in terms of reducing the correct detection) at a collection of five different combinations of compression levels and frame rates is provided by tables V, and VI. Table VII provides a summary of the top two lowest (negative) scored parameters for each system at the five different footage combinations. The parameter 'perpendicular' includes 98 attacks out of the total 110 attacks under investigation. It is normal that this parameter has been picked up by the logistic regression analysis as the most negatively influential parameter. Most systems seem to have a problem with parameters 'run', 'crouch run' (approach group) and 'close' (distance group). Perhaps, the developers of such systems do not expect the attacker to be close to the camera and their systems have not been tuned for such occasions. System developers, seeing the analysis included in this work, will be able to understand where their systems need improving.
The findings in this investigation do not agree with the subjective results reported in [5] . For example, for the camera to subject distance parameter the far scenes produced lower subjective scores than the close scenes (closer distance scenes provide more visual information). In case of some VA systems, the close distance attacks produced the lower scores. This confirms that the term image quality should not be used in the same manner for automated and human visual systems. Instead image acceptable (as defined in section 2) in terms of parameter acceptance to complete the identification task is a better-suited definition for automated systems.
CONCLUSION
This work provides a methodology on how automated algorithms can be tested with uncompressed and degraded footage. The results have shown that the proportion of correct attack detection for systems A and D at 5fps increases significantly with increasing bitrate (less compression). For the rest of the compression levels and systems, compression has not affected the overall performance of the systems. An analysis based on the scene content parameters enables detailed understanding on where systems need improvement. Each system, depending on how it has been designed, has shown to be affected negatively or positively by the parameters under investigation. Future work will include the same methodology to be applied on a different more complicated scenario (e.g. traffic monitoring) in order to expand understanding on the performance of automated algorithms.
